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Introduction
How to regulate access prices in network industries has been one of the major issues of debate both in academic circles and among policy makers and regulators over the last 10 to 20 years. While the literature has initially focused on pricing issues in a static context (see, e.g., Armstrong, 2002; Laffont and Tirole, 1998), more recent contributions have analyzed the relationship between access regulation and investment (see, for example, Gans and King, 2004; Foros, 2004; Kotakorpi, 2006; Vareda, 2007) . 1 Much of this literature concludes that stricter access price regulation usually has a negative impact on infrastructure investment, even though Vareda (2007) shows that the negative relationship between access price level and infrastructure investment only holds for quality enhancing investments, but not necessarily for cost-reducing investment. Common to most of these papers, however, is their shared focus on the incumbent's investments to replace or to extend the own network. Hence, the emphasis is on the investment incentives faced by existing infrastructure owners.
In contrast, a second stream of literature has focused on the entrants' investment incentives. In this literature it is often argued that tighter access regulation initially encourages competitors to invest into complementary infrastructure which they can later use to build alternative networks in order to bypass the incumbent's bottlenecks. This so-called "ladder of investment" idea has gained support and popularity among regulators and policy makers, particularly in telecommunications markets (see Cave & Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006) . While the "ladder of investment" idea highlights the importance of complementary infrastructure, it ultimatively also focuses on network substitution and infrastructure competition.
Our paper focuses on a third type of investment, namely investment into the quality of strictly complementary goods or services. To be more precise, we analyze the relationship between access regulation and investment incentives into both network and service quality if network usage and service provision are in a strictly complementary relationship to each other. Hence, in contrast to the "ladder of investment" perspective we analyze strictly complementary services which cannot substitute the original infrastructure but rather have to rely on access to this infrastructure.
An important example may be the (potential) regulation of broadband access markets, which also affects investment incentives for firms providing Internet services. Similarly, in railway markets the investment incentives for train operating companies (into rolling stock and services) are also influenced by the regulation of access to the rail network (i.e., the tracks, stations, traction power, etc.). The same holds for airlines whose investment incentives are at least partially determined by airport regulation (slot allocation, landing fees, etc.) or for ports, where shipping companies have to purchase complementary pilotage, towage and discharging services and also pay dock dues. Maybe most importantly, the relation between network charges and incentives to invest into complementary services is increasingly receiving attention in the debate over net neutrality regulations of the Internet (see, e.g., Schuett, 2010) .
Our analysis considers the complementarity between infrastructure investments and service quality and also accounts for potential differences regarding consumers' valuation of network and service quality. The latter is motivated by the observation that both the quality of the network and the quality of the consumed services are typically important for consumers, but not necessarily to the same extent. One example is broadband Internet access and Internet services (e.g., video streaming). The download speed for a particular service usually depends on both investment into network capacity/quality and investment into data compression techniques, the number of download servers and the like so that, from a consumer perspective, the perceived total quality depends on investment levels into both network and service quality which are complementary to each other. Given this constellation, the benefit from an increase in network quality may be below or above the utility of improved Internet service quality (such as better data compression for video download/streaming).
As we will show, in this context network price regulation clearly has a negative effect on the network operator's incentives to invest into network quality, but this may be more than compensated by an increase in investment incentives for providers of complementary services. However, we also show that tighter price regulation may not only reduce incentives to invest into network infrastructure, but investment incentives for complementary service providers may also decrease in the regulated network price. Put differently, higher access prices may not only increase investment incentives for network operators, but also for firms that provide complementary services. This finding contrasts the conventional wisdom among regulators that tighter network price regulation stimulates investment into complementary services. We show that either can be true, depending on (a) the relative cost of investment into network vis-à-vis service quality and (b) the relative importance of network versus service quality for consumers. Moreover, our paper demonstrates that a regulatory focus on how regulation affects incentives to invest into network infrastructure by either incumbent or entrant operators can be far too narrow if investment into the quality of complementary services is also important.
Model Setup
Consider a natural monopoly upstream network N which is used to provide complementary downstream services S, which are offered by two firms (S1, S2) who compete in Betrand fashion, offering differentiated services. The natural monopoly network is assumed to be regulated, and we analyze how changes in the regulated network charge p R N affect all three firms' decisions to invest into quality q i (i = N, S1, S2) as well as downstream firms' prices p i (i = S1, S2). We take the network charge (p R N ) as exogenous. This appears sensible to us, as in many countries and most regulated industries the cost standard on which price regulation is based (such as long-run incremental cost) is enshrined in law and can only be changed by an act of parliament. Given the regulated network charge, all firms choose their quality q i before the two downstream firms set their prices p S1 and p S2 . This sequence of moves reflects the idea that prices are typically easier to change than investments into quality or, put differently, quality decisions are rather long-term decisions while pricing decisions can be adjusted more quickly. Firms are assumed to maximize their profit:
for i = N , S1, S2.
The profit function consists of prices p i (i = N, S1, S2) multiplied by quantities x i , less the investment costs comprising the increase in quality q i given the quadratic investment costs
To reduce complexity we assume that there is no variable cost of production.
Consumers are assumed to jointly consume N and S. A variation of the representative consumer model gives the following demand 3 :
with j = 1, 2. Note that due to the complementarity between N and S demand for N is given as x N = x S1 + x S2 . Note that the utility of minimum quality is given as a S > 0 so that q N,S1,S2 denote quality upgrades above the minimum quality level. The substitutability of the two downstream firms' services is reflected in b which, therefore, also determines the intensity of competition. The factor γ ≥ 0 reflects the relative importance consumers assign to network quality compared to service quality. That is, we assume that in the eyes of consumers total quality is given by q S j + γq N , where a lower γ indicates less importance of network quality compared to the services' quality and vice versa. Prices p S1,S2 and p R N affect demand negatively.
2 This requires ki ≥ 1/2 (Assumption 1) to ensure investment levels are non-negative. 3 The underlying utility function is: U = (aS + qS1 + γqA)xS1 + (aS + qS2 + γqA)xS2 − (pA + pS1)(xS1) − (xS2)(pA + pS2) − We now solve the game deriving Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria and concentrate on a comparative static analysis of variations in p R N , as we consider this comparison to be most relevant for regulatory policy purposes. This is because (a) regulators are unlikely to pursue the objective of welfare maximization in reality and (b) even if they would, regulators usually lack the information and/or power to implement first-best prices. Hence, we focus on a comparative analysis of network price changes rather than on the calculation of first-best network charges.
Comparative Static Analysis
First, given an exogenously regulated network charge p R N , downstream price competition yields 4 :
Anticipating these prices, profit maximizing quality levels as a function of p R N are given as:
The network operator's investment is always negatively affected by stricter regulation of network charges (equation 4), but the magnitude depends on the intensity of competition in services (as measured by b) in a U-shaped curve. Not surprisingly, the overall investment is smaller the more costly investments are (as measured by k i ).
How a change in p R N affects q s is less obvious, as the sign of the derivative of ∂q s /∂p R N is ambiguous. First, note that the sign of the nominator determines the sign of the derivative ∂q S j /∂p R N given Assumption 2. Secondly, as equation 5 shows, changes of p R N affect q S1 and q S2 through a direct and an indirect effect. On the one hand, p R N directly decreases the (residual) demand for services as given by 2 and, therefore, higher network charges negatively affect incentives to invest into service qualities. An increase in the access price p R A by an amount reduces consumers' willingness-to-pay for the complementary services exactly by that amount , i.e., by a factor of 1. Hence, a higher network charge decreases consumers' willingness-to-pay for services and, thereby, leads to a reduction of investment into service quality. On the other hand, there is a countervailing indirect effect: An increase in p R N also leads to an increase in network quality by a factor of 2γ/[k N (2 − b)(1 + b) ] as can be seen from equation (4) . Any increase in network quality in turn also shifts out the demand for x S by a factor of γ as the demand equation (2) reveals, so that the indirect effect of an increase in p R N is to raise consumers' willingness-to-pay by a factor of 2γ 2 /[k N (2 − b)(1 + b) ] , due to the resulting increase in q N . Hence, the total effect that a change in p R N has on q S depends on the size of γ and k N . Put differently, the sign of the derivative ∂q S /∂p R N is determined by the sign of (2γ
. If network quality is sufficiently important for consumers (as measured through γ) and/or if network upgrades are sufficiently inexpensive (as measured through k N ), network price regulation (a lower p R N ) leads to lower network quality, q N and also to a lower quality of complementary services. If, however, service quality is more important for consumers (and γ relatively small) and/or if network upgrades are sufficiently expensive (as measured through k N ), network price regulation (a lower p R N ) leads to a higher quality of complementary services even though stricter regulation still induces a lower network quality, q N .These findings are summarized in the following propositions: Proposition 1. Network price deregulation (i.e., a higher p R N ) unambiguously leads to higher network quality and also to higher quality of related services if Given the second proposition, we analyze the impact of regulation on the perceived total quality. To determine the perceived total quality, we ask how consumers' willingness-to-pay for x S is affected. Put differently, we use a concept of perceived quality which is derived from the consumers' utility function and define total quality as:
The derivative of the so-defined total quality, Q T otal , with respect to p R N is given by:
6
The more important network quality is (as measured by γ), the less likely it is that softer regulation of network charges has a positive impact on the overall perceived quality. 
Conclusions
We have analyzed how network regulation affects investment into both a natural monopoly network infrastructure and complementary services provided by two firms competing in a differentiated Bertrand market. While stricter regulation of network charges negatively affects investment incentives for the regulated network operator, the effects on investment into complementary services can be either negative or positive, depending on the relative weight consumers assign to infrastructure vis-à-vis service quality. In fact, while stricter network price regulation always reduces the quality of the network infrastructure, it can still increase the perceived total quality if service quality is sufficiently important for consumers. From a policy perspective it may be interesting to note that a regulatory focus on how regulation affects incentives to invest into network infrastructure by either incumbent or entrant operators is too narrow if investment into the quality of complementary services is also important for consumers.
